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Gaza, Beesheba, Dhahriyya: 
Another Approach to the Negev Bedouins in 
the Israeli-Palestinian Space 
 
 
In Israel, the Negev Bedouins are often presented and perceived both by Jews 
and Arabs alike as a group of "loyal and obedient" citizens of the State. Like the 
Druze, they are viewed as being completely different from the rest of the 
Palestinians of Israel.1 Their relationships to the Palestinians of the Gaza Strip and 
the West Bank are considered inexistent. This commonly held opinion is often 
buttressed by reference to their "cultural specificities" and in particular to their 
"nomadic culture". Additionally, their political behavior is also cited, and is too 
frequently reduced to their voluntary enlistment in the Israeli army, and their low 
level of political militancy hostile to the State of Israel as compared to other 
Palestinians with Israeli citizenship or more simply, their reticence in presenting 
themselves as Palestinians. 
The idea that the Negev Bedouins are an isolated and a specific group is 
clearly also rooted in the words and deeds of the actors involved. This idea is 
further strengthened by direct or indirect support from researchers who have 
investigated this group. To date, the studies dealing with the Negev Bedouins have 
cast them solely in a binary relationship with Israeli society.2 Although some of 
these writers note the ties Bedouins have maintained with their relatives and 
neighbors in the West Bank and Gaza3 over the last fifty years, none have found it 
                                            
1 I use either the term “Arab Israeli” or “Palestinians of Israel” to designate non-Jewish 
populations who, before 1948, lived in Mandate Palestine and who, after this date were 
integrated into the State of Israel. These populations were granted Israeli citizenship during the 
first years following the founding of the State of Israel. Most of the Bedouins of the Negev 
obtained citizenship in 1954. 
2 This is the case for local anthropologists, such as Kressel, G.M., 1975, Pratiyut le’umat 
shivtiyut (Individual versus Tribality) Hakibutz Hameuhad; or foreign anthropologists such as 
Jakubowska, L., 1985, Urban Bedouin: Social Change in a Settled Environment. Ph.D Thesis, 
The State Unversity of New York at Stony Brook; for more recent works, see Dinero, S. 1997: 
Female Role Change and Male Response in Post Nomadic Urban Environments: The Case of 
the Israeli Negev Bedouin. Journal of Comparative Family Studies, vol. XXVIII (3): 248-261. 
Works by the geographer Avinoam Meir should also be cited: 1996, As Nomadism Ends: The 
Israeli Bedouin of the Negev. Boulder Westview Press. On the issue of political ties between 
the Bedouins and the State, see Basson, L., 1995. Les Bédouins du Néguev et l’Etat d’Israël, 
Monde arabe, Maghreb Machrek, 147 (janvier-mars): 149-165; Parizot, C. 1999, Enjeux 
tribaux et élections nationales, REMMM, 85-86 : 237-258. 
3 Marx E., 1967 The Bedouin of the Negev. Manchester: Manchester University Press; 
Lewando-Hundt, G., 1978 Women’s Power and Settlement. The effects of Settlement on the 
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relevant to examine this issue more deeply. From January 1998 to July 2000, while 
I was conducting research on this group, I was struck by the recurrence and the 
regularity of meetings and cross border exchanges involving Negev Bedouin and 
their relatives or neighbors living in the West Bank, the Gaza Strip or in the Sinai. 
Occurring as ‘non-events’, these activities cast doubt on the accepted view of 
relationships between the Bedouins of the Negev and their Palestinian neighbors 
and call for a renewed approach to this group and its status within the Israeli-
Palestinian space. 
Modes  of Integration and Processes of Differentiation 
Prior to 1948, the Bedouin groups living in the Negev were better known as the 
Arabs of Beersheba (`arab as-saba`). The Bedouins themselves used the term 
‘`arab’ instead of bedû (Bedouins), whereas they called the Arab farmers in the 
area “fellahîn” (farmers). Bedû, meaning inhabitants of the desert (Bâdiya), was a 
term used more often by farmers. In 1946, the number of Negev Bedouins was 
estimated at between 57,000 and 95,000 people.4 At the time, a pastoral semi-
nomadic life was still the rule, although most of the population was already 
involved in dry agriculture and some men were employed in road construction and 
infrastructure developed by the British. Since the end of the nineteenth century, the 
Turkish occupation of the region and its pacification and the creation of 
international borders had already contributed to the gradual sedentarization of the 
Bedouins who became more involved in agriculture and traded with merchants 
from the Gaza area, merchants who then exported these goods to Europe.5 The 
city of Beersheba was founded in 1900 for administrative reasons and expanded 
through land sales and agricultural products. In order to be closer to the 
authorities, the Bedouin Sheiks of the area quickly settled there. The first stone 
buildings also appeared among the Bedouin at this time, first to store farm 
products and then later as living quarters. Farms were also built in the 20s and 30s 
in the northwest Negev.6 However these buildings were reserved for the wealthy 
minority. 
The 1948 conflict and the founding of the State of Israel caused dramatic 
changes and brutal trauma for the Bedouin population. In 1953, the number of 
Bedouins remaining in the Negev was estimated at 11,000 people.7 The others 
were expelled manu militari or fled before the arrival of Israeli troops and took 
refuge in the West Bank, the Gaza strip and in the Sinai.8 Those who remained in 
the Negev were confined to an enclosed zone, located to the east and the north of 
Beersheba, and covering an area corresponding to 10% of the Negev desert. This 
                                                                                              
Position of the Negev Bedouin Women. Ph. D. thesis, University of Edinburgh; Jakubowska, L., 
op. cit. ; Kressel, G., 1992 Descent through Males. Wiesbaden: Otto Harrassowitz. 
4 Muhsam,H.V. 1966, Beduin of the Negev. Jerusalem: Jerusalem Academic Press: 22. 
5 Kressel, G. M., Ben David Y. & Abu Rabia, Kh., 1991, Changes in Land Usage in the Negev 
since the Mid-Nineteenth Century. Nomadic Peoples, 28: 28-55. 
6Meir, A., op.cit. chap. 3. 
7 Marx, E. op. cit., p. 12. 
8 Morris, 1997 [1987] The Birth of the Palestinian Refugee Problem: 1947-1949. Cambridge: 
CUP : 221, 245-246, 253 
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zone was later placed under military control, which lasted until 1966.9 The lands 
belonging to  
 
 
Bedouin Planned Townships and Unrecognized Villages in 1990. 
(Source : Meir, A., 1997 : 91) 
 
 
 
those who had fled or those who were expelled were confiscated, such that by the 
end of the 1950s, the new State had succeeded in appropriating over 90% of the 
land in the Negev and 50% of the enclosed zone.10 Until 1966, the Bedouins were 
                                            
9 Marx, E. op. cit 
10 Falah, G., 1999, Israeli State Policy towards Bedouin Sedentarization in the Negev. Journal 
of Palestinian Studies, vol. XVIII (2) winter: 71-91. 
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grouped around 19 tribes restructured in haste, and turned into administrative units 
headed by Sheikhs appointed by the military government. Excluded from the Israeli 
labor market, the Bedouins were restricted to livestock rearing and farming. The 
privileged few who were living in Beersheba or in stone buildings were forced to 
return to their tents to live. In the 1960s, the authorities decided to urbanize the 
Bedouins.11 This policy was dictated by their intent to take over more land to 
develop projects for the Jewish population. Officially, the policy was presented as 
a means of facilitating the Bedouins’ access to "modern" State services and 
resources, since the authorities claimed it was impossible to provide these services 
to such a ‘scattered’ population. First of all, two established townships were built: 
Tel as-Saba`, in 1965, and Rahat in 1970. Between the early and late 1980s, five 
other towns were founded, chronologically: Ksîfa and `Ar`ara, Shgîb as-Salam, 
then Hûra and Lagiyya. These projects, however, failed. Most of the Bedouins 
refused to live in them. They were afraid of losing their land and were not 
attracted by the precarious social and economic situation of these cities. Even 
repeated intimidation tactics (massive confiscation of livestock, demolition of 
houses in unrecognized encampments, destruction of crops)12 did not increase their 
exodus to these townships. 
Today, these townships are home to slightly less than half of the Bedouin 
population of the Negev, a population estimated at 120,000 people. The 
remainder lives in small villages that were built during the 1960s on the sites of 
what had become permanent encampments. More permeable to new modes of 
consumerism and representations transmitted by the dominant Jewish culture, 
young Bedouin couples began to construct permanent housing. In addition to 
planting orchards, the construction of these houses was also perceived as means 
of demonstrating their attachment to the land. These hamlets are scattered for the 
most part alongside main roads.13 Some only contain a few families whereas 
others are home to several hundred, or thousand people. However, because these 
locations are not recognized by State authorities, they do not appear on any maps. 
In addition, they have no infrastructure or utilities. The inhabitants improvise their 
water distribution systems and use generators to produce electricity. 
The established townships have become dormitory suburbs on the edge of 
Beersheba. The largest, Rahat, today has a population of 30,000 whereas the 
smallest, Lagiyya, has only 2,000. The infrastructures are often in disrepair and are 
not adapted to the needs of the population. Commercial and industrial activities 
are virtually nonexistent. The lack of activity and the low level of skill of the 
workforce make this population extremely dependent on economic centers 
controlled by the Jewish populations in the area, and particularly sensitive to 
economic recessions. In the late 90s, the unemployment rate reached 29% for men 
and 83% for women.14 
                                            
11 Marx, E. 2000 Land and Work: Negev Bedouin Struggle with Israeli Bureaucracies. Nomadic 
Peoples, 4 (2): 106-121. 
12 Al-Afenish, S., 1987, Processes of Change and Continuity in Kinship System and Family 
Ideology in Bedouin Society. Sociologia Ruralis, vol. XXVII (4) : 323-340 
13 Meir, A., op. cit 
14 Marx, 2001 : 113. 
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Lastly, in fifty years, the Bedouin population that remained in the Negev has 
undergone profound upheavals. Lifestyles and economic activities have become 
increasingly urban, based to a greater extent on salaried labor in the surrounding 
cities. The administrative regimes which followed the military administration and 
which, since the end of the nineteen eighties have given municipal autonomy to the 
Bedouins in the townships, have contributed to a renewal of the elites and to the 
undermining of preexisting hierarchies. Today, the tribe (`ashîra) has only symbolic 
relevance. The cohesive groups formed by kinship ties are constituted by lineages 
(`â’ilât). At best they form frameworks for mobilizing people during national 
elections (Parizot, 1999). The extended family remains an economic unit,15 but not 
systematically. Mutual assistance among its members has lost its meaning because 
of growing access to the services of the Welfare State.16 
Over the last fifty years the Negev Bedouins have developed practices, 
representations and modes of organization that differ considerably from the ones 
they shared with their relatives who in 1948 were expelled or who fled to the West 
Bank, the Gaza Strip or the Sinai. Interspersed with other groups in the occupied 
territories, placed under different administrative regimes (Jordanian and Egyptian), 
these refugees themselves experienced upheavals that heightened the process of 
social differentiation. At the end of the 90s, the Bedouins differed from both the 
Palestinians and from the Jews in the neighboring areas because their integration 
into Israeli society has taken place within the structures of spatial, economic, and 
social segregation. Although a few people have chosen to live in Beersheba, the 
Bedouins today live cut off from the Jews who represent 75% of the population of 
the Beersheba sub-district. Similarly, although Bedouins have daily contacts with 
their Jewish neighbors within the framework of economic activities, these relations 
are ones of subordination. Finally, although the standard of living of the Bedouins 
has constantly been on the increase in the last fifty years, it remains one of the 
lowest as compared to the national level: 50% of all families and 60% of all 
children live under the poverty line. A survey conducted by the Central Bureau of 
Statistics showed that at the start of the Year 2000, the seven Bedouin townships 
were the poorest out of the 200 agglomerations included in the entire country, 
whereas some Jewish cities in the Beersheba suburbs were ranked among the 
richest.17 
 
From “Arabs of Beersheba” to “Negev Bedouins” : ethnicization and 
communitarization 
Aside from this exclusion model, the Negev Bedouins have been involved in a 
process of ethnicity and community building. By adopting the Turkish millet system 
(based on the principle of self-government of religious groups) the State of Israel 
employed a method that turned religious and cultural groups within its population 
into statutory groups. It first of all differentiated Jews from non-Jews, and then 
made a number of subdivisions within the latter group, differentiating Moslems 
                                            
15 Jakubowska, L. 2000, Finding Ways to Make a Living: Employment among the Negev 
Bedouin. Nomadic Peoples, 4 (2): 94-105 
16 Meir, 1997, p. 191-192. 
17 Statistical Yearbook of the Negev Bedouin, 1999, Center for Regional Development, Ben 
Gurion University of the Negev: Table, 17.3. 
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from Christians and assigning each their own courts of law to resolve individual 
claims.18 The system then further complexified. Subdivisions and other criteria for 
particularization were included. The Druze acquired a special status in the fifties.19 
Their willingness to serve in the Army (like the Circassians, a Moslem group 
originally from the Caucasus) enabled them to benefit from special privileges as 
regards rights and benefits. In 1967, this system was applied to the populations in 
Gaza, the West Bank, the Sinai and the Golan. Each group was given a specific 
status, further complicating the overall picture. 
The Bedouin category appeared fairly rapidly on official forms, next to 
Moslems, Druze, Christians, and Circassians. However the gradual differentiation 
of the Bedouins as a statutory group in its own right was never fully completed. 
The authorities never hid their intention to dissociate them from other Palestinians 
with Israeli citizenship, but there was never a coordinated policy to this end. The 
Bedouins have the same legal status as the other Moslems. Similarly, in contrast to 
what is generally believed, they do not have a regime that differs from other 
Moslems or Christians as regards army service. Officially, aside from the Druze 
and the Christians, the Arabs, hence including the Bedouins, are automatically 
exempt from military service. They can however volunteer to serve. Up until the 
1960s, with a few exceptions, there were no Bedouins in the Israeli army. It was 
only in 1966, on the initiative of a Bedouin sheikh from the Negev, that a special 
unit reporting to the Interior Ministry was formed made up of trackers and border 
guards, recruited from the Bedouin. It was not until 1972 that a tracker unit 
(gashashim in Hebrew) was created specially for the Bedouins and placed under 
Army control. 
The publicity given to this new unit and the efforts of certain members of the 
military establishment to enlist more Bedouins quickly gave the illusion that, like 
the Druze, this group was favorable to the draft. Nevertheless, although the 
number of volunteer Bedouin has risen in the ranks of the IDF, it remains small. 
According to a civil servant in the Ministry of Public Security, in the last fifty years, 
there have only been 3000 Bedouins in the ranks of the army in various units. This 
figure covers Bedouins from the Galilee and those from the Negev; note that more 
of the former volunteered than Bedouins from the Negev. At the end of the 1990s, 
the gashashim unit only totaled 160 soldiers. Each year the army recruits a 
maximum of 25 people among the Negev Bedouins, turning down numerous 
candidates. Lastly, the number of young recruits among the Negev Bedouins is 
apparently lower than volunteers from the rest of the Moslem and Christian 
populations of the triangle20 and the Galilee. In other words, the stereotyped 
image of Bedouins as eager volunteers for military duty is more of a myth than a 
reality. 
Herein however lies the strength of the categorizations imposed by the Israeli 
legal system. Reiterated in formal and informal discourse and on administrative 
forms, these categorizations end up shaping discourses and representations of 
                                            
18 Abu Ramadan, M., 2001, Les minorités en Israël et le droit international. Thèse de doctorat ; 
Université de droit, d'économie et des sciences d'Aix-Marseille III, Aix-en-Provence. 
19Rivoal, I., 2000, Les maîtres du secret. Ordre mondain et ordre religieux dans la communauté 
druze en Israël. Paris, EHESS  
20 Region covering the Arab villages located between Tel Aviv and Haifa. 
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Jews and Arabs in the country. The judicial framework and its complexity do not 
only produce statutory inequalities between members of the Israeli population as a 
function of their membership in a given group.21 Rather, by using terms that freeze 
and highlight cultural differences among these groups, they create ethnic entities. 
These entities however are far from corresponding to coherent and relevant 
groups. Note that the term bedwi (pl. bedwin) in Hebrew includes both the Bedouin 
of the Negev and those of the Galilee in a single category although these two 
groups have nothing in common historically and have practically no contacts with 
each other today. Beyond this, this terminology also informs on the content of 
relationships between the target group and the State, and other communities 
making up the Israeli population, hierarchizing them as a function of their 
presumed loyalty to the State. The term ‘Bedouin’ in Israel does not only refer to 
populations who in the past were wandering shepherds. It also refers to the idea 
that they are "loyal Arabs" to Israel. By contrast, the term Moslem refers to a "fifth 
column", and the term Palestinian, to an enemy. 
Ahmed Sa’di22 has already stressed this point. Acording to Sa’di, by 
emphasizing the cultural features of each group, this categorization highlights the 
points of cleavages between each, and defines the nature of the relationships they 
have with the State. The term "Israeli Arabs" which covers "Druze", "Moslems", 
"Christians", "Bedouins" and "Circassians" presents these groups as a cultural 
minority and confirms the mono-national character of the State of Israel. It 
disregards these groups’ ties with the land of Palestine and makes them foreigners 
in the land of Israel (Eretz Israel). Finally, it separates them from the Palestinians of 
the West Bank and Gaza with whom these groups have various ties. 
The ethnic representation of the Negev Bedouins, by stressing their isolation as 
compared to other groups, did not occur solely through the discourse and policies 
of the State of Israel. Like all category ascription,23 it took place through a 
dialectical process in which the Bedouins played a prime role. The situation of 
Otherness created by the drastic upheavals which affected this group, facilitated 
the process of reconstruction of tradition within the framework of terms imposed 
by the dominant discourse. In numerous contexts, the Bedouins no longer use the 
ethnic label ‘arab’ (literally, Arab) to describe themselves contrasted with the term 
fellahîn to designate the neighboring Arab populations, as was still the case in the 
1950s. Today they use the term bedû, a term used primarily by their Arab 
neighbors. In addition the content of the tradition, reconstructed in this way, is 
often structured around clichés and criteria defined by the Jewish or Palestinians 
populations in the area. Other Palestinians, whether Israeli citizens or not, stress 
the exotic nature of the "Bedouin culture" as the Jews do. Many view the "Negev 
Bedouins" (bedû an-naqab in Arabic) as members of a "traditional", "primitive" 
culture when they do not perceive them as "suspicious". 
The internalization of this ethnic label has been reinforced by its recurrent 
manipulation in the political discourse of Bedouin leaders. In the 1970s, Sheikh 
                                            
21 Abu Ramadan, M. op. cit. 
22 Ahmed Sa’di, Between State Ideology and Minority National Identity: Palestinians in Israel 
and Israeli Social Science Research ; Review of Middle Eastern Studies, 5, 1992, pp.110-130 
23 Barth, F. 1995, Les groupes ethniques et leurs frontières. In : Poutignat, Ph. & J. Streiff-Fenart, 
Théories de l’ethnicité. Paris : PUF : 203-249. 
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Hammâd Rabî`a, a Negev leader, took up the Labor Party’s suggestion to form a 
Bedouin list for the 1973 and 1977 elections. Labor’s objective was to create ties 
between the Bedouin in the Negev and those in the Galilee and to facilitate the 
emergence and the crystallization of shared community spirit between these two 
groups, but the project failed.24 Nevertheless, in the Negev, forms of 
communitarian expression soon appeared. In the late 70s, an "Association for the 
Defense of Bedouin Rights" was founded. In the early eighties, few groups were 
daring enough to formulate their demands as "Arabs" or "Palestinians", fearing 
that this would draw criticism from the authorities. As Lonia Jakuowska 25shows, 
the local actors preferred to express their demands as "Negev Bedouin citizens” to 
dissociate their claims and their conflicts with the State from the Israeli-Palestinian 
conflict. It was only after the first Intifada, and with the growing influence of 
nationalistic groups in the region that the Negev Bedouins formulated their 
demands as Palestinians. 
However this late-coming ‘national awakening’ as certain local activists like to 
call it, ran up against the identity crisis that affected the Palestinian population of 
Israel at the start of the 1980s, which also mired the Bedouins. The loss of 
credibility of the Arab political parties, marginalized on the Israeli political scene, 
and the signing of the Oslo Accords confirmed the separation of the fate of the 
Palestinians in the West Bank from those with Israeli citizenship, and encouraged 
on the part of the latter, a distancing on the national issue, or created a ‘moral 
gap’26. The members of this group thus turned inward towards local issues to seek 
more significant identification symbols derived from the framework of kinship, or 
the religious and cultural community.27 At the end of the 1990s, although local 
leaders and members of non-governmental bodies tended to express their 
demands as "Israeli Palestinians", they tended to prefer the term "Negev Arabs". 
This term expresses their desire to be placed on the same level as other Arab 
citizens of Israel. However it also shows their spontaneity to dissociate themselves 
from the Palestinians of the West Bank, as well as the priority given to the defense 
of the interests of their own community. 
Over the last 50 years, the different modes of administration imposed on the 
Bedouins by the Israeli authorities have contributed to marginalizing this group as 
compared to their Jewish and Arab neighbors in the region, and this 
marginalization has fueled a process of ethnicity and the emergence of a feeling 
of community which are expressed in public and political areas. This said, these 
processes are still on-going and do not account for the complexity of the situation 
of this group. They are constantly being challenged by the spatial practices that the 
local actors continue to engage in as ‘non-events’. 
                                            
24 Soen, D. & A. Shmuel, 1987, The Israeli Bedouin: Political Organization at the National 
Level. Middle Eastern Studies, 23 (3): July: 329-347. 
25 Jakubowska, L. 1992, Resisting Ethnicity: The Israeli State and Bedouin Ethnicity. In: 
Nordstrom, C. & Martin J. The Paths to Domination and Terror, Berkeley, Los Angeles, Oxford: 
University of California Press: 85-105 
26 Bichara, A. 1996, L’Arabe en Israël. Un discours politique mutilé. Revue d’études 
palestiniennes, 7 printemps : 55-75 
27 idem. 
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Neighborly Relat ions and the expansion of the Negev Bedouins’ social  
space 
Although in 1948 the Bedouins were separated from their relatives who had 
taken refuge in the Gaza Strip and in the West Bank or on the other side of the 
international border with Egypt, in the Sinai, they never broke off their ties with 
them. In the years immediately following the 1948 war, groups of Bedouins, 
resettled in the closed zone close to the TransJordan armistice line developed 
contraband networks on a more or less extended scale. Afterwards, these 
networks extended towards Gaza. A parallel economy developed through these 
activities and was a source of considerable additional income. 
Conflicting with the security argument put forward by the State of Israel in 
order to legitimize the creation of a closed military zone in regions of Arab 
habitation, the borders of these zones were very loosely patrolled, like the 
southern part of the ceasefire line between Israel and the West Bank. Similarly the 
military authorities quickly realized the advantages of exploiting these networks. 
Thus, in the 1950s, Moshe Dayan went in person to the Negev to meet the Bedouin 
Sheikhs and organize a contraband livestock network. Officially it was designed 
to import meat for army needs. In fact, it appears that this meat also reached the 
Israeli markets of the time. The livestock was brought from Syria, Iraq, Saudi 
Arabia and Yemen.28 From the 1960s onwards, the military administrators were 
more conciliatory with the Bedouins and allowed them to leave the zone more 
freely to enter the rapidly expanding labor force of that time. Thus the Bedouins 
benefited the Jewish populations in the area, who were also very interested in 
contraband products. Numerous goods such as transistors, stockings, and olive oil 
were cheaper when they came from Jordan. 
In the center of the Negev, near the place where Mitzpe Ramon now stands, a 
few Bedouins joined the confederation of the `Azâzme, who had been given 
permission to stay outside the closed military zone. In other words, they quickly 
took advantage of their proximity to the Egyptian border on the other side of which 
their relatives had fled or had been expelled. This border was crossed frequently 
by groups of Bedouins until the end of the 1950s and led to several clashes with 
Israeli troops and the neighboring kibbutzim. Thus these contraband networks, to 
which should be added the hospitality provided at times to certain feda’iyin, 
formed channels by which almost permanent information could flow among 
groups separated at the end of the war. 
In 1967, the occupation of the Gaza Strip, the West Bank and the Sinai by the 
Israeli army enabled groups located on either side of the border to re-establish 
more sustained ties. The most significant example is provided by the many 
marriages that in 1967 reunited families separated in 1948. In some cases these 
marriages were celebrated in the months immediately following the military 
occupation. How quickly they took place appears to show that the ties between the 
groups had never been totally severed. Afterwards, Bedouins tried to marry 
daughters of farmers from the West Bank or Gaza. The small number of women in 
the Negev made polygamy particularly hard. The opening of the borders enabled 
                                            
28 Abu Rabi’a, A., 1994, The Negev Bedouin and Livestock Rearing: Social, Economic and 
Political Aspects. Oxford: Berg Publishers; Marx, E. 1967 op.cit. 
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men with financial means and the necessary contacts to increase their symbolic 
capital and that of their group of agnates. This was made even easier by the fact 
that the maher (usually translated by ‘bride price’) was at the time much lower in 
the West Bank and Gaza than in the Negev. Similarly, farmers in these areas 
wanted to extend their network of relationships to the other side of the Green Line. 
Those who wished to work in Israel hoped that by marrying into Bedouin lineages, 
they could take advantage of middlemen working with Jewish businessmen or with 
the Israeli authorities. 
The new ties had an impact on the economic activities of both groups. The 
Dhahriyya market, in the small town located at the entrance to the West Bank on 
the road connecting Beersheba to Hebron, became a more attractive option for the 
Bedouins than the Beersheba market. Even the some of the Jewish inhabitants in 
the area went to the market for its low prices. Reviving a practice dating back to 
before 1948, the livestock breeders of the Negev again hired shepherds in the 
villages of Sammu` and Yatta (to the east of Dhahriyya). Similarly the livestock 
market of Beersheba, where these breeders came every Thursday to sell their 
products became more popular with the farmers of the West Bank and Gaza. The 
growth of these relationships was made even easier by the fact that up until the 
late 1980s, movement remained fairly unrestricted between the various parts of the 
territory under Israeli control. 
During the first Intifada (1987-1993), the Israeli authorities changed their 
attitude, increasing the number of controls and further restricting movement of 
Palestinians outside the West Bank. However the cross border relationships re-
established in 1967 did not cease. Young Bedouins took advantage of the lack of 
public transportation to drive people from the West Bank in minibuses to 
Beersheba and its suburbs or vice versa. After the signing of the Oslo Accords, 
these drivers continued their activities despite the growing restrictions on 
movement imposed on the Palestinians of the West Bank and Gaza. Even closures 
after terrorist attacks did not appear to be insurmountable obstacles, except for 
the inhabitants of the Gaza Strip. In fact, some Bedouins became specialized in 
skirting check points (mahsom) and patrols, using dirt paths as detour routes (turûg 
al-leffe). 
Since the second Intifada, the more repressive attitude of the authorities has 
restricted but not stopped movement. During the first semester of 2001, West Bank 
workers still built prefabricated houses for the Bedouins in unrecognized 
encampments or in the townships. These men were driven by young Bedouins who 
were temporarily converted into "worker smugglers" (muharrib `ummâl), and who 
also transported goods from the Dhahriyya market and the West Bank to the 
townships and unrecognized encampments. Private cars also continued to use the 
detour paths. People thus did not stop visiting each other, even though these visits 
took place less often and were shorter. 
The economic and social ties that developed from 1967 onwards have also 
taken on a political coloration. The matrimonial alliances between lineage 
members separated in 1948 have enabled several groups to form sociopolitical 
units with more clout on the community level. At the same time, by serving as go-
betweens for the Palestinians in the occupied territories with the Israeli authorities, 
either to find them jobs, or to enable them to settle in Israel or obtain citizenship, 
some leaders have extended their network of clientele and their influence on a 
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regional level. Men who initially had little stature in the Negev have reached a 
level many would envy today. The Palestinians in the occupied territories have not 
been the only ones to have recourse to these go-betweens. As soon as the 
Bedouins who remained in the Negev after 1948 were able to travel more often in 
the West Bank and Gaza, within the framework of their economic or social 
activities, they needed the assistance of a patron, either for protection or to obtain 
funds and make connections. By developing client networks on the other side of 
the Green Line, the Bedouin leaders in the Negev inevitably extended and 
reinforced the relationship of dependence they had with other Bedouins in the 
region. 
After the signing of the Oslo Accords, the emergence of the Palestinian 
Authority created a new political actor and changed the nature of preexisting 
relationships. The Bedouin leaders who had ties with individuals in the new 
administration obtained direct access to these men’s funds and influence over 
sections of the Palestinian autonomous area. They were able to strengthen their 
role as go-betweens for those around them and their clients in the Negev as well 
as for those living in these districts. They had the power to resolve everyday 
problems (fines, seizure of goods), cut administrative red tape to obtain 
authorizations needed to start up a small business, a building permit, etc. Some of 
these leaders took part in more important matters. In 1998, a young leader from 
the Hûra area was contacted by someone from a lineage close to his. He asked 
him to get in touch with his contacts to try to arrange the liberation of one of his 
agnates living in the West Bank, who had been arrested by the Palestinian police. 
The prisoner was released that same day. Thanks to their relationships with high-
ranking civil servants in the Palestinian administration, some Negev Bedouins have 
also developed highly lucrative illegal cross border activities. Car theft is a 
flagrant example. The cars stolen by Bedouins in the Negev are often sold as is or 
as parts in zones under Palestinian authority. Some inhabitants of these zones are 
apparently specialized in dismounting parts or altering the appearance of these 
cars. This type of activity, which is hard to conceal, requires the complicity of the 
Palestinian authority whose fleet of automobiles is not always made up of legally 
purchased vehicles. 
Aside from these illegal activities, there are many areas where ties with the 
Palestinian authority constitute a considerable political advantage. It is hence 
understandable that in the 1990s, the Bedouins hoping for local or regional power 
mobilized some of their efforts to develop this type of cross-borders ties. Between 
January 1998 and the beginning of the second Intifada in September 2000, I 
frequently attended receptions organized by Bedouin leaders in the honor of civil 
servants from the Palestinian authority. The staging of neighborly relationships with 
individuals from the Palestinian authority was not unusual, and fully mimicked the 
regular and continuous efforts by these same leaders with the Israeli civil servants. 
During the municipal elections of November 1998 in Rahat, local candidates’ 
connections with Palestinian authority chiefs was used as a political argument to 
gain more votes. One of the candidates for mayor asked one of his friends to 
contact one of Yasser Arafat’s security service chiefs. During a meeting, he wanted 
to introduce him to the members of his electoral staff, to impress them by the scope 
and quality of his relations and hoped that they would mention it in their own 
circles. The candidate wished to appear as the unrivaled go-between in the eyes of 
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the voters of Rahat who had interests in the Palestinian autonomous areas. His 
opponents also used the same technique. Without organizing a meeting of this 
nature, their brochures presenting their platforms and numerous pictures of them in 
the company of Israeli politicians and high ranking officials, also included several 
additional pictures where they appeared alongside the head of the Palestinian 
authority. Even one of the candidates for mayor, known for his support for the 
Israeli Labor party, used this ploy. 
Until September 2000, local representatives of the Israeli authorities did not 
appear to be opposed to the establishment of this type of relationship. On the 
contrary, several Jewish officials in the region even tried to develop their own 
contacts with their counterparts in the Palestinian authority, without going so far as 
the Bedouins or other Palestinians with Israeli citizenship. Such networks constitute 
both potential channels of information and potential means of reaching the 
Bedouin population. The clientele that they can develop with the former is then 
used advantageously in a variety of circumstances, in particular when these 
officials need local support to implement and have an administrative plan 
accepted, given that their efficiency is the key to their promotion. During national 
elections, they use additional arguments to solicit votes in favor of the political 
party they support. 
Officials in Arafat’s administration can also benefit from these contacts. They 
also collect precious information and have direct or indirect access to the services 
of their Israeli counterparts, a set of resources which enables them to enlarge the 
scope of their personal influence within their administration and their population. 
From this angle, the creation of the Palestinian Authority has complicated 
relationships between the Bedouins who remained in the Negev and their 
neighbors in the West Bank and Gaza. Since this new actor has emerged on the 
regional political scene, the inhabitants of the occupied territories are in a position 
to offer or negotiate certain services with the Bedouins and secondarily with their 
Jewish neighbors whereas prior to this they were the claimants or dependent. 
Conclusion 
The exchanges and the cross-border relationships between Bedouins and their 
Palestinian neighbors and kin in the occupied territories all prompt the circulation 
of people, goods and representations. They have direct effects on the social 
processes in which the Bedouin population remaining in the Negev and the 
Palestinians in their areas are involved. They also structure relationships within the 
Bedouin community and the status of its members as regards their Arab neighbors. 
Some groups have developed greater ties with their Palestinian neighbors in the 
West Bank and Gaza or with their Egyptian neighbors, whereas other are in closer 
contact with the Palestinian population with Israeli citizenship in the region of Lod 
or Ramle, or the Galilee triangle. The differences in orientations of these ties can 
contribute to the emergence of differing interests within the Negev Bedouin 
community. Young Bedouins who are involved in drug dealing between Egypt and 
Israel are little inclined to be the promoters of Palestinian nationalism, not only 
because of the distance from other Palestinian populations but also because they 
do not wish to attract the attention of Israeli authorities. By contrast, the Bedouins 
living in zones along the border with the West Bank are more likely to nourish such 
feelings, first of all because they have on-going relationships with their Palestinian 
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neighbors and relatives and secondly because they are in closer contact with 
Palestinian nationalistic organizations in Israel and the occupied territories. At this 
stage in the analysis, only hypotheses can be made as to the real impact of these 
ties in the structuring of relationships between the Bedouins and their neighbors. It 
should be recalled that although these cross-border ties can indeed reconstitute 
networks that existed before 1948 or create new ones, day-to-day experiences of 
inequality with the Other can also reinforce feelings of difference and fuel 
particularistic discourse. Further research is thus needed. 
Nevertheless, this preliminary analysis shows that the process of ethnicity in the 
Bedouin population is a construction over time but one that is continually 
challenged and complicated by the practices of the actors in this space. Previous 
studies of the Negev Bedouins have too often restricted this space to the State of 
Israel within its internationally recognized borders, excluding the West Bank and 
Gaza. However, the social space of this population also extends to the East and 
the West, covering part of the occupied territories, or the Sinai for the Bedouins 
living in the central Negev. It is hence imperative for a better grasp of the 
processes affecting the Bedouins – and in the final analysis other Palestinian 
groups in the region, since the Bedouins do not appear to be the exception – to 
take a broader approach than those suggested by the dominant discourse. 
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